The fall of Fort Washington and Fort Lee

In a council of war, the American generals now worked out a four-way division of the army. The garrisons under General Greene already at forts Washington and Lee would try to continue to hold the lower Hudson. As a second line of defense for this essential waterway, 3,000-4,000 men under General William Heath were to be stationed at the Highlands forts, thirty miles upriver at Peekskill. Some 7,000 troops from the New England and New York regiments would guard New England by staying at New Castle, commanded by General Lee. Washington himself would cross the Hudson with the regiments which had come from the Jersey side. There were only about 2,000 of them fit for duty, but the commander hoped for reinforcements from the 5,000 soldiers whom Greene might not need for the defense of Fort Lee.
From this decision on, everything went downhill. On abandoning his pursuit of Washington at White Plains, Howe had marched down the east shore of the Hudson to Manhattan, and within a short time had surrounded the American position at Fort Washington, except at the west where high cliffs fell to the river. It was an extensive post, with the fort itself commanding a ridge almost four miles long and three-quarter mile wide. Patriot possession of this ridge was like a cancer in the middle of the British flank, and an assault would only be a matter of time.
Another ominous note was added when three British ships sailed up the Hudson River, past the defenses over which Fort Washington presided, and receiving literally no damage at all. General Washington then wrote Greene, asking “what valuable purpose can it answer to attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had?” He instructed his general to prepare for an eventual evacuation of both Forts Washington and Lee, and to begin an immediate removal of valuable stores and supplies “which you do not deem necessary for your defense.” Greene replied that the garrison at Fort Washington pinned down twice its number of British troops, and kept the enemy from communicating between Manhattan and the New York mainland. “I cannot conceive the garrison to be in any great danger. The men can be brought off at any time.” Washington, who expected soon to be on the scene himself, let matters rest there.
Some good news was arriving from the north, where a British Army under Sir Guy Carleton had been coming down from Canada, hoping to link up with Howe, and isolate all of New England. However, on Lake Champlain they had encountered an improvised fleet under Benedict Arnold, who had inspired his floating soldiers to fight against an infinitely superior British naval force. Hour after hour against hopeless odds they fought with such heroic ferocity that the British seem to have become discouraged and returned to Canada. Deeply troubled by his own men’s unwillingness to stand up to the enemy, Washington filed away in his mind that he had a valuable officer in the person of Brigadier General Benedict Arnold.
On November 12, Washington led his part of the army across the Hudson and marched down the west shore to Greene’s headquarters at Fort Lee. He was met there by nothing but discouraging news. Instead of the 5,000 men he had hoped to find there, the fort contained less than half that number, and these “showed no disposition to afford the least aid.” Greene had completely ignored his orders to remove extra stores from the forts, and, far from preparing a withdrawal from Fort Washington, had actually sent in more men and supplies. Though his staff officers urged him to override Greene with immediate orders to bring back the troops across the river, Washington hesitated. He had a high opinion of Greene, who surely was more familiar with the immediate situation than he was. Besides, the major point of danger seemed to him not so much Fort Washington, as the route through New Jersey, which lay completely open to a British march. Surely, Howe had designs on the American capital; he almost certainly would mount an attack in that direction. Washington assumed that the British commander would leave behind a detachment that would in typical leisurely manner besiege Fort Washington. Against such an attack, the fort could hold out long enough to permit an orderly evacuation. And so, Washington finally acquiesced in Greene’s policy, although it was “repugnant to my own judgment.”
On November 15, George Washington rode on to prepare for the defense of the Jersey crossing to Philadelphia. He had hardly reached Hackensack, when a messenger galloped in with the news that action had started at Fort Washington. Within a day, a combined British and Hessian force overpowered the Manhattan fort. Only four days later, a force of 5,000 British under Lord Cornwallis, and under the protection of the Royal Navy, crossed the Hudson, fell upon Fort Lee, and in short order overpowered it, nearly seizing Nathanael Greene himself in the process. Not only was all Manhattan now British, with another strong fort on the Jersey side, but the material losses were overwhelming: hundreds of cannon had been captured, muskets by the thousands, plus huge stores of ammunition, along with tents, blankets, tools, and clothing. Worst of all, thousands of irreplaceable trained troops were now lost for good – Maryland and Virginia riflemen, Connecticut rangers, and on and on. And now Lord Cornwallis set out to pursue Washington and his small force across New Jersey.